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THE RECENT APPLICATION OF NEGATIVE POLICY INTEREST RATES IN THE EURO 
AREA AND IN OTHER ECONOMIES: RATIONALE AND PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE ON 
THEIR EFFECTS
The authors of this article are Jorge Martínez Pagés and Antonio Millaruelo, of the Directorate General Economics 
and Statistics.
This article analyses the recent application of negative policy interest rates by several 
central banks, including the ECB. The preliminary evidence presented suggests that the 
use of this additional monetary policy headroom appears to have been effective in the euro 
area, prompting — together with the other expansionary measures — easier financial 
conditions. The article also discusses possible adverse effects associated with the 
application of negative interest rates. 
In mid-2014 the ECB initiated a phase that saw a further easing of its accommodative 
monetary policy stance. Among other measures, it placed for the first time one of its policy 
interest rates — the deposit facility — below zero. The adoption of this measure was followed 
by subsequent cuts, meaning that at present the deposit facility rate stands at -0.4%. 
In recent years other central banks, those of Sweden, Denmark and Switzerland, and more 
recently Japan and Hungary, have also placed their policy interest rates at negative levels. 
In some cases, this measure has been in response to external factors (especially in small, 
open economies such as Denmark and Switzerland), contributing to containing capital 
inflows and the subsequent appreciation of their currencies. In other cases, meanwhile, 
the justification arose from internal factors (the ECB and the Bank of Japan), related to the 
need to provide a greater degree of monetary stimulus, against a background of sluggish 
aggregate demand, now that policy interest rates had reached zero. 
The second section of this article reviews the economic arguments behind the application of 
negative interest rates as a monetary policy tool, and analyses the recent experience of the 
countries that have applied this measure, along with the attendant rationale and 
implementation.1 The third section addresses the evidence available to date on the impact of 
this monetary policy instrument in the case of the euro area and of Spain. The fourth section 
focuses on the discussion of possible unwanted effects associated with this measure. 
Traditionally, zero has been considered as the effective lower limit for nominal interest 
rates.2 This notion was based on the view that no investors would be prepared to acquire 
an asset with a lower-than-zero return (i.e. one where investors would ultimately have less 
capital than their initial outlay), as they would have the alternative of keeping their funds in 
cash, whose nominal return is zero, but not negative.
However, recent experience as described below has shown that nominal interest rates 
may stand at negative values. This is so since, although cash does not lose nominal value 
over time, it does have non-negligible costs compared with other assets (bank deposits, 
securities, etc.) that lend themselves to electronic management. These costs, which 
include storage, insurance and transaction costs, are generally limited for small amounts, 
but higher if bigger amounts are involved. Usually, such costs particularly affect large 
Introduction
Negative interest rates: 
economic rationality and 
recent experiences
1  This experience is also reviewed in Bech and Malkhozov (2016) and in Jackson (2015).
2  Indeed, there is extensive economic literature on the implications of the zero lower bound (ZLB) on interest rates 
for optimal economic policies.
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corporations and financial institutions, which carry out frequent transactions involving high 
volumes. Accordingly, investors would be prepared to accept negative interest rates on 
certain investments, if the amount they have to pay for them is less than the cost of the 
alternative of keeping these funds in cash. In practice, then, the lower interest rate bound 
will not necessarily be determined by the zero level, but by cash maintenance costs. 
In fact, in recent years several economies have placed their policy interest rates at negative 
levels. Specifically, in chronological order, Sweden, Denmark, the euro area, Switzerland, 
and, in 2016, Japan and Hungary too (see Chart 1), have done so. 
At the onset of the global financial crisis, the ECB deployed a broad range of measures 
with the dual aim of providing liquidity against the collapse of the interbank market and of 
responding to the acute economic recession then commencing.  The measures included a 
sharp, swift cut in interest rates, the provision of abundant liquidity (using fixed rate tender 
procedures with full allotment, i.e. at the demand of banks) and the progressive lengthening 
of the maturities of refinancing operations up to three years in the two very long-term 
refinancing operations (VLTROs) conducted in late 2011 and early 2012.3 In the context of 
the European sovereign crisis, the ECB also took measures (including most notably the 
SOURCES: Datastream and Banco de España.
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3  These two operations were conducted to address bank debt rollover risk at a time when the wholesale debt 
markets were closed down in some euro area countries as a result of financial fragmentation.  
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OMT4 programme) to restore its monetary policy transmission mechanism and to defuse 
the risk of the area breaking up. Subsequently, from June 2014, faced with the loss of 
momentum in activity and the growing risk of the deanchoring of inflation expectations, 
the ECB embarked on a fresh path of monetary accommodation. For the first time, it 
placed its deposit facility rate in negative territory, subsequently cutting it on several more 
occasions, down to -0.4% in March this year.  Moreover, the ECB created liquidity-
providing instruments conditional upon bank credit expansion, namely the TLTROs5, and, 
in the last quarter of 2014, it introduced new private-sector asset purchase programmes, 
which it extended notably in early 2015 with a government debt purchase programme and 
again in 2016 with a corporate debt programme.  
The ECB was not the first central bank to adopt negative interest rates following the global 
financial crisis. Excepting a distant precedent in the 1970s, when Switzerland imposed 
penalty rates on non-residents’ Swiss franc deposits, in recent years Sweden (whose 
monetary authority pursues an inflation-targeting strategy) has been the first country to 
implement them, as part of a package of measures to respond to the recession prompted by 
the 2008 financial crisis. Hence, after cutting its key (repo) rate to 0.25% in July 2009, it 
adopted a negative deposit rate of -0.25%, which it held until September 2010. In July 2014, 
in the face of persistently low inflation, it reduced its deposit rate to -0.5%. In February 2015, 
after the announcement of the ECB’s extended quantitative easing programme, the Swedish 
central bank set its repo rate below zero for the first time, placing it at -0.5% in February 2016. 
Denmark, the second country to adopt negative rates, has followed a fixed exchange rate 
policy since 1982, first against the Deutschmark and later against the euro. Generally, the 
Danish central bank reacts to an exchange rate fluctuation intervening on the foreign 
exchange markets, which it occasionally reinforces with adjustments of its interest rates. 
Using these means the central bank countered the European Monetary System crisis in 
the early 1990s, the global financial crisis in 2008 and the successive bouts of crisis on the 
European sovereign debt markets. In this latter context it cut its certificate of deposit (CD) 
rate to -0.2% in July 2012, in order to deter capital inflows that were exerting upward 
pressure on the Danish krone. In January 2013, once tensions had partially abated, the 
central bank placed this rate at -0.1%, at which it held until April 2014, when it returned to 
positive territory. In September 2014, to check the appreciation of the krone, due in part to 
the deepening of the Eurosystem’s expansionary monetary policy stance, the central bank 
cut its CD rate to -0.05%. Following the announcement of the ECB’s extended asset 
purchase programme in January 2015, it once again substantially cut the CD rate, lowering 
it to -0.75% in February that year.6
Switzerland, for its part, targets an inflation rate of lower than 2%. However, as a small, 
open economy, and a financial centre that attracts investment flows seeking safety (safe-
haven assets), the monetary authority is concerned to maintain a degree of exchange rate 
4  In its OMT (Outright Monetary Transactions) programme, announced in the summer of 2012, the ECB declared 
its readiness to undertake purchases of sovereign debt of highly stressed countries on the secondary market in 
exchange for their accepting an ESM conditionality-based financial assistance programme. The mere 
announcement of the programme considerably lessened the risk of a break-up, and there has been no need to 
date to activate it. 
5  This type of longer-term refinancing operation (LTRO), known as a targeted longer-term refinancing operation 
(TLTRO), allowed institutions to obtain liquidity at a term of up to four years provided their lending to the non-
financial private sector (excluding mortgage lending) exceeded certain reference levels. Into 2016, the ECB has 
announced new operations of this type (TLTRO II), the first auction of which was in late June, at which negative 
rates could be applied if certain credit expansion conditions were to be met. 
6  A year later, in early 2016, the Bank of Denmark raised its CD interest rate to -0.65 %.
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stability. From late 2007, the Swiss franc began swiftly to appreciate and, at the end of 
2008, the Swiss central bank placed its interest rates close to zero, while it began to use 
non-conventional instruments, such as exchange rate interventions, which burgeoned in 
episodes of financial market stress.7 In September 2011, it set a minimum exchange rate 
of Swiss Franc 1.2 per euro, and it defended this parity over the following three years at 
the cost of increasing its external reserves. Following the ECB’s announcement of OMT 
in September 2012, reserves stabilised at around Swiss Franc 500 billion. Since mid-
2014, however, coinciding with the new accommodative phase of the ECB, capital 
inflows rose once more and, faced with a growing incurrence of euro-denominated 
exposures, the Swiss central bank adopted negative interest rates of -0.25% in December 
that year. In January 2015, given the acceleration in the build-up of reserves, the 
monetary authority had to abandon the minimum exchange rate and cut its interest rates 
further to -0.75%.8
Finally, the most recent examples of countries that have placed their interest rates at 
negative values are Japan and Hungary. The Bank of Japan, in a pre-emptive step against 
the increase in downside risks to economic activity and inflation, decided in January 2016 
to place its interest rates at -0.1%, applied to a portion of financial institutions’ reserves at 
the central bank, thereby contributing to reinforcing the quantitative and qualitative 
expansion (QQE) measures it undertook in April 2013.9 Likewise in April, the Bank of 
Hungary placed its interest rate on overnight deposits at -0.05%, owing too to similar 
considerations of downside inflation risks, and like the Bank of Japan it has expressed its 
readiness to make further interest rate cuts if necessary. 
In the current context of a growing aggregate surplus of reserves held by credit institutions 
in the Eurosystem, short-term interbank market interest rates are chiefly determined by the 
interest rate on the deposit facility. Accordingly, since the deposit facility rate turned 
negative in June 2014, the average interest rate on overnight lending transactions in the 
euro area (EONIA) has tended to draw closer to this benchmark and has been negative 
since late 2014, standing, on average, at -0.33% in June this year (see Chart 2.1). The 
recent reductions in the EONIA and expectations that policy interest rates will stand at 
negative levels for a further period have contributed to bringing about likewise negative 
returns on longer-dated interbank transactions (-0.27-%, -0.16 % and -0.03 %, at the 
three-, six- and twelve-month terms, respectively, on average in June this year). 
The amounts traded on the interbank market at the very short term have also fallen 
appreciably in the recent period (see Chart 2.2). Nonetheless, this appears to be in 
response above all to the abundant surplus of liquidity prompted by the debt purchase 
programme and not so much to the adoption of negative deposit facility rates. Operations 
on this market usually respond to the redistribution of liquidity among institutions, in a 
setting in which some require funds and others have surpluses. When, as is now the case, 
liquidity is so high that few banks have net requirements, such redistribution becomes 
clearly less necessary. It is worth highlighting, in this respect, that the traded volume did 
not begin to fall as from the introduction of negative interest rates in June 2014, but rather 
from the opening months of 2015, which is when the purchase programme was considerably 
extended to encompass purchases of government debt securities. 
Transmission of negative 
rates and evidence of their 
impact in the euro area 
and in Spain 
7  In the opening months of 2010, in mid-2011 and in the systemic phase of the European sovereign crisis in 2012. 
8  On both occasions, the mention of interest rates refers both to the mid-point of the target band for the three-
month Swiss Franc LIBOR fluctuation and to the central bank’s sight deposit rate. 
9  At that time the Bank of Japan, given its difficulties in placing the inflation rate close to target, announced its 
intention to double the monetary base within a timespan of two years in order to achieve inflation of 2%. 
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To date, there has been no noticeable increase in the circulation of banknotes in the euro 
area (see Chart 2.3) that might signal agents’ wish to avoid negative returns by accumulating 
cash. In 2015 there was a minor acceleration in the pace of increase of the outstanding 
balance of cash, but it was moderate and subsequently reversed. 
Under normal conditions, the reduction in actual and expected short-term interbank rates 
also translates into a compression to some extent of longer-dated interest rates. At the 
SOURCES: ECB and Banco de España.
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same time, the lower resulting returns act as an incentive to reinvest in higher-risk 
alternative assets and to grant bank loans, an effect that may be even greater with negative 
interest rates. Further, the lower return on euro-denominated assets, other things being 
equal, would prompt a depreciation of the euro by increasing investors’ preference for the 
higher returns in other currencies. 
The evidence available since the introduction of negative interest rates in the euro area is 
consistent with an easing in financial conditions, although it should be borne in mind that 
such conditions have, in the recent period, also been influenced by other monetary policy 
measures, such as asset purchases and TLTROs.10 That hampers assessment of the specific 
impact associated with the cut in policy interest rates to below zero. As Chart 2.4 shows, the 
euro depreciated significantly following the announcement in June 2014 of the ECB’s new 
package of expansionary measures until the opening months of 2015. Subsequently, there 
was a partial reversal in this movement as a result of the tensions on global markets, the 
change in expectations about interest rate rises in the United States and the depreciation of 
sterling. There was a downward shift in Spanish and euro area government debt yield curves 
practically in parallel (see Charts 2.5 and 2.6). The movements in the longer-dated terms are 
logically more related to the Eurosystem’s government debt purchase programme than to 
cuts in policy rates. Yet the significant decline in the shorter-dated segments of the curve, 
which is more directly affected by the changes in monetary policy rates, is also expected to 
have contributed to the observed easing in financial conditions. 
Regarding the impact on credit institutions, Chart 3.1 shows the response of certain 
market interest rates and of rates on banks’ new lending and deposits in the last three 
episodes of declines in the Eurosystem’s policy interest rates, the last of which corresponds 
to the period of negative interest rates. The exercise is performed for the euro area 
aggregate, for its core11 and for Spain. Given the different scope of the cuts in each case, 
the changes are shown re-scaled (divided) by the change in the interest rate on the deposit 
standing facility. An initial conclusion of this exercise is that the relative impact on bank 
interest rates has not been less in the last episode of cuts than in the two previous ones, 
although a contributing factor here, especially in the case of loans, would have been the 
other expansionary measures applied by the Eurosystem (asset purchases and TLTROs)12.
Asymmetry is observed in the response of interest rates on lending and on customer 
deposits (with a greater decline in the former than in the latter), which occurs in all episodes 
and not only when policy interest rates are negative. In the last episode this asymmetry is 
somewhat greater, which may be partly linked to the existence of a certain floor effect in 
deposit interest rates when these draw close to zero, although it should also be borne in 
mind that the Eurosystem’s other expansionary measures would have been a contributing 
factor here. The presence of a floor to deposit interest rates can be most clearly discerned 
in Charts 3.2 to 3.5. Although the average deposit rate has tended to fall since June 2014 
(both in Spain and the euro area), in those countries where rates were already close to zero 
there has been practically no additional reduction and this barrier has only been breached 
(i.e. negative average rates have been applied) in the case of the deposits of non-financial 
corporations in certain countries.
10  See Banco de España (2016a).
11  Including countries whose government debt maintains an AAA rating (Germany, Austria, the Netherlands 
and Luxembourg).
12  An analysis with Spanish bank lending interest rate equations, available at the Banco de España, does not 
show evidence of a significant change in the response of such rates to reductions in market interest rates 
since June 2014. 
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SOURCES: ECB and Banco de España.
a All the changes are re-scaled, being divided by the change in the deposit standing facility interest rate of the related episode.
b Includes AAA-rated countries: Germany, Austria, the Netherlands and Luxembourg.
c The different average rates (NDER) on new business are weighted by outstanding balances, provided these are available, and otherwise by the volume of new 
transactions.
d Maximum and minimum values per country, within the euro area, in each period.
e Deposit standing facility.
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This asymmetrical pattern of bank interest rates has translated into a narrowing of the 
spread between the return on lending and the cost of new business deposits since June 
2014, both in the euro area and in Spain, with the effect somewhat more pronounced in our 
country, where the starting point was at higher levels (see Chart 4.1). However, in terms of 
the margins associated with outstanding balances, which are those that most directly 
affect banks’ income statements, changes have been very moderate in the euro area as a 
whole and virtually zero in Spain (see Chart 4.2). It is interesting to note the greater stability 
of the margin on balances in Spain compared with the euro area, especially bearing in 
mind that, in Spanish banks, the weight of variable rate loans is greater than in the euro 
area on average. This result is largely due to the fact that Spanish banks have so far been 
able to offset the adverse effects on their net interest income associated with the decline 
in interest rates by means of a re-balancing of liabilities from term deposits to (lower-
yielding) sight deposits. Specifically, from May 2014 to May 2016, the proportion of term 
deposits to total retail deposits fell from 52% to 37%. 
The replies from institutions taking part in the April 2016 Bank Lending Survey (see Charts 
4.3 and 4.4) confirmed that the introduction of negative interest rates in the euro area has 
contributed to reducing the cost of credit and has exerted a negative impact on banks’ net 
SOURCES: ECB and Banco de España.
a Using average rates (NDER) on new business, weighted by outstanding balances, provided these are available, and otherwise by the volume of new business.
b Using the average rates (NDER) of outstanding amounts, weighted by balances.
c Percentage of banks indicating an increase minus percentage of banks indicating a reduction, weighting considerable changes by 1 and lesser changes by ½.
d Simple mean of values relative to loans to non-financial corporations, loans to households for house purchase and loans to households for consumption and 
other purposes.
LOAN-DEPOSIT MARGINS AND IMPACT OF NEGATIVE INTEREST RATES CHART 4
-1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
-1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
%
1  MARGIN ON NEW BUSINESS (a)
Jul -08 Jul-09 Jul-10 Jul-11 Jul-12 Jul-13 Jul-14 Jul-15 Jul-16Jul -08 Jul-09 Jul-10 Jul-11 Jul-12 Jul-13 Jul-14 Jul-15 Jul-16
%
2  MARGIN ON OUTSTANDING AMOUNTS (b)
-60
-50
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
Net
interest
income
Lending
rates (d)
Loan
margin (d)
Non-interest
rate
charges (d)
Lending
volume (d)
%
3  BANK LENDING SURVEY, APRIL 2016. SPAIN
NET REPORTED IMPACT ON DIFFERENT VARIABLES (c)
-60
-50
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
Net
interest
income
Lending
rates (d)
Loan
margin (d)
Non-interest
rate
charges (d)
Lending
volume (d)
%
4  BANK LENDING SURVEY. APRIL 2016. EURO AREA
NET REPORTED IMPACT ON DIFFERENT VARIABLES (c)
 SPAIN  EURO AREA  3-M EURIBOR  DEPOSIT STANDING FACILITY
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 11 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, JULY-AUGUST 2016 NEGATIVE POLICY INTEREST RATES IN THE EURO AREA AND IN OTHER ECONOMIES
interest income. Banks would, to some extent, have attempted to counter this with 
increases in non-interest rate charges, such as commissions. 
Outside the Eurosystem, the international evidence also suggests that the application of 
negative interest rates in the recent period appears to have been broadly effective, 
prompting easier financial conditions and stabilising exchange rate tensions in countries 
where this was the intended objective.13
Further to the recent application of negative policy interest rates, discussion has arisen on 
the possible problems and unwanted effects of this measure.14 An initial raft of questions 
refers to their possible impact on the functioning of specific payment systems and financial 
instruments, the interpretation of the interest rate applicable in certain credit contracts and 
the difficulties in the tax treatment of negative interest. Even though these problems can 
on occasion be significant, the recent evidence in the euro area and in other countries that 
have applied negative rates shows that such problems have, so far, been manageable and 
that they do not, in principle and given the levels of negative rates observed, constitute a 
decisive argument against their introduction. 
It has also been indicated that the expected expansionary effect of negative interest rates 
would not occur or would do so to a lesser extent as a result of the adverse impact that 
this measure would have on savers’ and financial intermediaries’ income.  Savers, facing 
low returns on their investment, would have to save more to attain the same future income, 
which would dampen consumption; and financial intermediaries, with their profitability 
squeezed by the difficulty of passing through cuts in rates to their liabilities, might contract 
rather than expand their supply of credit. 
In this connection, it should first be stated that these arguments, notwithstanding their 
greater or lesser validity, are not confined exclusively to negative interest rates; rather, they 
apply broadly to any expansionary monetary policy. Hence, a decline in interest rates 
always penalises savers and benefits debtors. The scale of these distributive effects 
depends on numerous factors, such as the marginal propensity to consume of the agents 
concerned or the predominant type of loan (fixed or variable rate). In any event, empirical 
evidence shows that a reduction in interest rates generally has an expansionary effect on 
aggregate spending. This is so, in part, because along with the aforementioned redistributive 
effects, there is another effect that encourages aggregate demand (consumption and 
investment demand alike) as opposed to saving, through the intertemporal substitution 
channel. In this respect, there are no clear reasons for believing that this channel operates 
differently when nominal interest rates are moderately negative. 
As regards the impact of negative interest rates on financial intermediaries15, it should be 
borne in mind that these agents raise funds and grant financing simultaneously, meaning 
that in principle they are affected both on their assets and liabilities sides. Accordingly, 
insofar as the reduction in policy rates into negative territory feeds through symmetrically 
into returns on both sides of the balance sheet, their unit net interest margin would not be 
affected. In practice, however, and as seen in the previous section, asymmetries usually 
arise in the pass-through of movements in interest rates. This occurs, firstly, because the 
maturities of assets and liabilities need not be equal, exposing banks to interest rate risk. 
Possible adverse effects 
of negative interest rates 
13  In this respect, see Jackson (2015), Viñals et al. (2016) and Demiralp et al. (2016).
14  See, for example, Bank for International Settlements (2016).
15  See also Banco de España (2016b) and European Central Bank (2016).
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Thus, for example, insurance companies (especially in central European countries) have 
liabilities with insured returns at very long terms, whereas their assets have shorter-dated 
maturities. In this setting, the reduction in interest rates hampers the obtaining of sufficient 
returns with which to meet liabilities-side commitments. Conversely, banks at which fixed 
rate loan transactions predominate and which finance themselves at shorter terms tend to 
benefit from a context of falling interest rates. 
But reductions in policy interest rates also squeeze banks’ liabilities margin (the difference 
between the short-term market return and that on customer deposits). This is so because 
of the practical difficulties of applying interest rates lower than zero to depositors. While, 
as indicated earlier, there is some scope for introducing negative returns on deposits, 
such scope is limited, especially in the case of retail customers. Indeed, the evidence 
available to date is that while in countries that have been applying negative policy rates 
there are some instances in which large corporations and financial intermediaries are 
facing negative returns on their deposits, this has not been the case in any circumstances 
with retail depositors. 
The potentially adverse effects on banks’ income will tend to be greater in those cases in 
which retail financing predominates and in which the return on assets is swiftly updated, 
either because the bulk of loans are short-term or because they are referenced to short-term 
market interest rates. In this respect, these effects would foreseeably be comparatively 
greater in Spain than in the euro area as a whole, since both the weight of retail financing and 
the proportion of variable rate loans are greater in Spain than in the euro area on average. 
In extreme scenarios, marked by interest rates that are very negative and persistent over 
time, the adverse effects on credit institutions’ income statements might ultimately hinder 
their capacity to generate own funds and give rise to a tightening of credit supply, which 
would limit the effectiveness of the monetary policy measure. Likewise, faced with the 
marked narrowing of their net interest margin, banks might restrict the extent to which they 
pass through cuts in policy rates to the cost of their loans, thereby dampening the positive 
effect of an expansionary monetary policy on the supply of financing in the economy.16
it should further be borne in mind that, from the standpoint of macroeconomic effects, the 
counterpoint of this potential adverse impact on banks’ income is greater net income for 
the other sectors (households and non-financial corporations), by means of lower net 
payments by these agents to financial intermediaries (interest on loans less returns on 
deposits). As with the previously mentioned asymmetrical effect between savers and 
debtors, this channel entails a certain redistribution of income, whose net aggregate 
effects will depend on the relative situation of economic agents, including banks and the 
financial system in general. This redistribution, for example, improves the position of 
debtors by reducing their interest payments and it contributes to a decline in non-
performing loans, which positively affects banks’ income statement, thereby mitigating the 
negative effects on net interest income. There is also a positive effect on banks’ income 
derived from the higher aggregate spending that the reduction in interest rates entails and, 
therefore, a higher volume of financial transactions. 
Finally, it has been pointed out that negative interest rates might prompt excessive risk-
taking, with negative consequences for the economy and for financial stability in the 
16  As appears to have happened to some extent in Switzerland and Denmark, as shown in Bech and Malkhozov (2016).
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medium and long term, although these possible effects are not exclusive to negative rates 
but broadly apply to a setting of highly expansionary monetary policies over a prolonged 
period. As in the case of the effects on banks’ income statements, the possibility of these 
unwanted effects arising warrants a monitoring of these risks and an assessment of the 
measures which, where appropriate, might be applied to mitigate them. Here, 
macroprudential policies appear especially suited in instances in which situations of risk in 
specific parts of the financial system are detected. 
6.7.2016.
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